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FAIR AND REASONABLE COMPENSATION MEANS JUST
THAT: HOW § 253 OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ACT PRESERVES LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY
OVER PUBLIC RIGHTS-OF-WAY
Jennifer Amanda Krebs, M.A.
Abstract: Section 253(c) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act expressly preserves local
government authority to require fair and reasonable compensation from telecommunications
providers for use of public rights-of-way. Although local government authority to require
compensation for franchises is based in state law, some courts have overlooked state law
when evaluating the validity of franchise fees. In addition, courts have interpreted § 253(c)
narrowly, allowing local governments to recover only direct costs. This narrow interpretation
of § 253(c) contradicts its text and legislative history, as well as analogous United States
Supreme Court precedent. Further, this interpretation could lead to unconstitutional results,
by allowing a taking of public property without just compensation and permitting Congress
to commandeer local governments into implementing a federal regulatory program.

A new technology emerged and transformed peoples' lives. The
technology brought remarkable advances in communications-families
separated by vast distances became connected, businesses explored new
markets and served previously unreachable customers. t At the same
time, new concerns surfaced. Who was in control of this technology?
What mechanisms were in place to ensure privacy for the information
transmitted through this medium? How could the majority of people
access and benefit from the technology, rather than the privileged few?
Understanding the importance of this technology to the nation, the
federal government took action to encourage its proliferation. Local
governments, eager to benefit their citizens, struggled to retain
traditional control over companies doing 2business within their
jurisdictions and to protect public rights-of-way.
What was this new technology that opened so many doors yet created
so many issues for the nation? The internet? The cell phone? No-the
telegraph, in the nineteenth century. Over one hundred years later, local
governments face strikingly similar issues with the proliferation of
telecommunications technologies.

1. See TOM STANDAGE, THE VICTORIAN INTERNET, at VII (1998).

2. See infra Part IV.
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In 1866, Congress passed the Post Roads Act (Telegraph Act) to
encourage the development of new telegraph technology. 3 One hundred
thirty years later, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 19964
(1996 Act) to encourage the development of telecommunications
technology, including broadband access to the internet. 5 Section 253(a)
of the 1996 Act prevents state and local governments from prohibiting
the entry of telecommunications providers into local markets.6 At the
same time, § 253(c) expressly preserves local governments' rights to
require compensation from telecommunications companies that use
public rights-of-way. 7 Courts have disagreed about how much
compensation 8local governments can require, and how to calculate this
compensation.
This Comment argues that under § 253, courts should first consider
state law to determine the local government's authority to impose a
franchise fee, and then apply a "totality of the circumstances" approach
to determine whether the fee is fair and reasonable. Part I of this
Comment discusses public rights-of-way and franchising under state
law, and the scope of federal authority over these areas. Part II explains
how § 253(c) of the 1996 Act preserves local government authority over
public rights-of-way, and Part III summarizes the various ways courts
have interpreted this section. Part IV describes the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Telegraph Act of 1866, 9 which
upheld the authority of local governments to require right-of-way fees.
Part V argues that the correct way for courts to apply § 253(c) is to first
examine local government franchise and right-of-way authority under
state law, and then consider the totality of the circumstances to
determine if a franchise fee is fair and reasonable. Part V further argues
that unless courts interpret § 253(c) in this way, unconstitutional results
could occur, such as the taking of public property without just
compensation, or the federal government commandeering local
governments to implement a federal regulatory program.

3. See Alexander J. Field, The Regulatory History of a New Technology: Electromagnetic
Telegraphy, 2001 L. REv. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L. 245,248 (2001).
4. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.

§§ 151-614 (2000)).
5. See City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001).
6. See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000). See infra Part II.B for text of § 253.
7. See 47 U.S.C. § 253(c).

8. See infra Part I I.B.
9. Telegraph Act of 1866, ch. 230, 14 Stat. 221 (repealed 1947).

Fair and Reasonable Compensation
I.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CAN REQUIRE COMPANIES
USING PUBLIC RIGHTS-OF-WAY TO PAY COMPENSATION
AND OBTAIN FRANCHISES

10
State law governs how local governments own and control property.
Under state law, local governments control public rights-of-way," l which
are segments of land designated for public use. 12 Local governments use
13
franchise agreements to grant utilities access to these rights-of-way,
and state law constrains the terms of these agreements. 14 State
governments, and not the federal government, are sovereign over local
governments in the context of public rights-of-way and franchising
authority.' 5 Nevertheless, federal constitutional guarantees protect local
governments from congressional overreaching. 16

A.

State Law Controls Local Government Interests in Public
Rights-of-Way

Public rights-of-way are "public corridors or strips of land,"' 7 such as
streets and alleys,' 8 designated for public travel. Portions of rights-ofway are often used for utility infrastructure.' 9 This infrastructure can
include wires strung on poles above and through streets and alleys,20
wires and cables buried below streets in conduits, 21 and utility boxes
installed on public property. 22 Public rights-of-way are a valuable

10. See Central Life Assurance Soc'y of United States v. City of Des Moines, 171 N.W. 31, 32
(Iowa 1919); State ex rel. Scott v. Superior Court, 173 Wash. 547, 548, 24 P.2d 87, 88 (1933);
EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 30.39 (3d ed. 1990).

11. See MCQUILLIN, supranote 10, § 30.39.
12. See id. § 30.40.
13. See California v. Cent. Pac. R.R., 127 U.S. 1,40 (1888).
14. See MCQUILLIN, supranote 10, § 34.10.
15. See infra Part I.A-B.
16. See infra Part I.C.
17.

PAUL DEVANEY, AM. PUB.WORKS ASS'N, RIGHTS-OF-WAY MANAGEMENT § 1.3.2 (2001),

available at http://www.apwa.net/Documents/ResourceCenter/Rights-of-WayMgt.pdf.
18. See id.; see also MCQUILLIN, supranote 10, § 30.03.
19. See DEVANEY, supra note 17, § 3.3.
20. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 10, § 30.10.
21. See id.
§ 30.06.
22. See AT&T Communications v. City of Dallas, 52 F. Supp. 2d 763, 766 (N.D. Tex. 1999),
vacated as moot by 243 F.3d 928 (5th Cir. 2000); Cox Communications v. City of San Marcos, 204
F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274-75 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
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asset23-- they have value as land 24 and are necessary for utilities. 25 The
recent increase in telecommunications technologies in the United States
has depended on the availability of public rights-of-way for facilities
installation.2 6
State law controls local governments' property interests in public
rights-of-way. 27 Although there are many models of local government
authority over rights-of-way,28 they fall into three general categories.
First, local governments can own rights-of-way in fee,29 with an
undivided ownership interest and full title. 30 Second, local governments
can hold easements in rights-of-way, 3' giving them a possessory interest
in the land32 while allowing abutting property owners to retain title.33
Finally, local governments can hold rights-of-way in trust for the
public. 34 Even if the local government does not hold title to the property,

it has certain rights and responsibilities, such as improving and
maintaining the property.35
B.

Local Governments Grant Franchises to Private Companies for
Use ofPublic Rights-of-Way

A franchise is a method developed by governments to grant use of
public land to private companies for purposes benefiting the general
public. 36 Franchises are common law creations dating back to
23. See Am. Pub. Works Ass'n, Policy Statement on Public Rights-of-Way Management I,
available at http://www.apwa.net/Documents/GovtAffairs/Policies/ROW/Pub_ROW.pdf (2002).
24. One organization has estimated the total value of state and local public rights-of-way in the
United
States
at
more
than
four
trillion
dollars.
See
http://www.telecommunityalliance.org/issues/valuation2002.html (last visited June 19, 2003).
25. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 10, § 30.44.
26. See Am. Pub. Works Ass'n, supranote 23, at 1.
27. See Mayor of Baltimore v. United States, 147 F.2d 786, 788 (4th Cir. 1945).
28. See McQUILLIN, supra note 10, § 30.32.
29. See id.
30. See GRANT S. NELSON, WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, CONTEMPORARY
PROPERTY 227 (1996).

31. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 10, § 30.32.
32. See NELSON ET AL., supranote 30, at 688.
33. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 10, § 30.32.
34. See Caporal v. United States, 577 F.2d 113, 116 (10th Cir. 1978); Mayor of Baltimore v.
United States, 147 F.2d 786, 788 (4th Cir. 1945); N.J. Payphone Ass'n v. Town of W. New York,
130 F. Supp. 2d 631, 638 (D.N.J. 2001), aff'd, 299 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2002).
35. See Mayor of Baltimore, 147 F.2d at 788.
36. See California v. Cent. Pac. R.R., 127 U.S. 1, 40 (1888).

Fair and Reasonable Compensation
fourteenth-century England,37 where the sovereign granted private
parties use of public property under certain conditions.3 8 A franchise
allowed a private party to provide a service that was both a public
necessity and a natural monopoly.3 9 In the United States, local
governments use franchises to give right-of-way access to companies
providing services that require intensive infrastructure, such as electrical
and telephone utilities.4 °
Telecommunications companies often need access to public rights-ofway for their equipment, 41 and must obtain local government permission
before installation.42 Telecommunications infrastructure is created by
44
43
stringing wire to utility poles, burying wire in below-ground conduit,
or, in the case of wireless facilities, by placing utility boxes in strategic
locations. 45 To obtain a franchise, telecommunications companies often
agree to requirements such as plan notification,4 6 performance bonds,47
access to books and records,4 8 and fees.4 9
Local governments traditionally charge private companies franchise
fees to access public rights-of-way. 50 Most cities have ordinances
establishing these fees. 51 The ordinance can require compensation in the
form of a percentage of the company's gross revenue within the local
37. See Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 432 (1837).
38. See Cent. Pac.R.R., 127 U.S. at 40.
39. See Neil Lehto, First Amendment and Right of Way Issues in Cable Television, in
PROTECTING FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION: FIRST AMENDMENT AND LAND USE LAW 173, 174-75
(Daniel R. Mandelker & Rebecca L. Rubin eds., 2002).
40. See id. at 175-76.
41. See Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1308 (D.N.M. 2002).
42. See id.; Qwest Corp. v. City of Portland, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1254 (D. Or. 2002); see also
MCQUILLIN, supra note 10, § 34.10.
43. See PECO Energy Co. v. Township of Haverford, No. 99-4766, 1999 WL 1240941, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1999); Bellsouth Telecomms. v. City of Orangeburg, 522 S.E.2d 804, 805 (S.C.
1999).
44. See TCG N.Y. v. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 2002); Qwest
Communications v. City of Berkeley, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
45. See sources cited supra note 22.
46. See Bellsouth Telecomms. v. City of Mobile, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1263 (S.D. Ala. 2001).
47. See Bellsouth Telecomms. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11 th Cir. 2001).
48. See id.
49. See AT&T Communications v. City of Eugene, 35 P.3d 1029, 1033 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
50. See City of Dallas v. Metro. Fiber Sys. of Dallas, No. CIV.A.398CV2128R, 2000 WL
198104, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2000); Bellsouth Telecomms. v. City of Orangeburg, 522 S.E.2d
804, 805 (S.C. 1999); see also MCQUILLIN, supranote 10, § 34.37.
51. See Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d at 1175.
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franchising area,52 permit charges, 53 in-kind services for the local
government,54 or fees per linear foot of right-of-way used.55 The local
government may use the fees to pay for right-of-way management, such

as permitting, inspection, and decreased road life, 56 or for general
governmental purposes.57

State law controls franchise authority, 58 including the conditions local
governments can place on telecommunications providers, 59 and the
compensation allowed for use of the public rights-of-way.60 States can
directly grant communications providers access to local public rights-ofway. a But, a local government cannot require compensation beyond that
authorized by its state. 62 For example, Colorado prohibits local
governments from requiring compensation from telecommunications
companies beyond "costs directly incurred., 63 Oregon, however, allows
local governments to charge franchise fees of up to seven percent of a
telecommunications provider's gross revenue.64 Other states, such as
Alabama, do not restrict franchise fees, and local governments can
require fair and reasonable5 compensation based on a telecommunications
provider's gross revenue.6

52. See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 621 (6th Cir. 2000); City of Orangeburg,
522 S.E.2d at 805.
53. See Bellsouth Telecomms. v. City of Mobile, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1263 (S.D. Ala. 2001).
54. See City of Gary v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149, 152 (Ind. 2000).
55. See AT&T Communications v. City of Eugene, 35 P.3d 1029, 1033 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
56. See id.
at 1034.
57. See City of Orangeburg, 522 S.E.2d at 805.
58. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 10, § 34.10.
59. See City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1174 (9th Cir. 2001); City of Orangeburg,
522 S.E.2d at 807.
60. See City of Gary v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149, 159 (Ind. 2000).
61. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-5.5-101 (2001).
62. See City of Denver v. Qwest Corp., 18 P.3d 748, 757 (Colo. 2001); People v. Kerr, 27 N.Y.
188, 213 (1863); City ofZanesville v. Zanesville Tel. & Tel. Co., 59 N.E. 781, 785 (Ohio 1901).
63. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-5.5-107(l)(b).
64. OR. REV. STAT. § 221.515 (2002).
65. ALA. CODE § 11-50B-3 (2002); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-130i (2002) (granting
municipalities the authority to require compensation). For current information on public right-ofway laws in all fifty states, see the National Telecommunications and Information Administration
website at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/staterow/rowtableexcel.htm (last visited July 28,
2003).

Fair and Reasonable Compensation
C.

The FederalGovernment Cannot Infringe Local Government
PropertyRights or Commandeer Local Governments into
Implementing FederalRegulatory Programs
The U.S. Constitution grants limited enumerated powers to the federal

government. 66 The powers that remain are reserved to the states or the
people.6 7 States, therefore, have broader general powers than the federal
government. 68 The Commerce Clause 69 is an example of a limited grant

of federal power. 70 Under the Commerce Clause, Congress can exercise
broad authority over interstate commerce and related issues. But
Congress' authority is not unlimited. 71 For example, Congress may not
commandeer state or local governments into enacting legislation on
behalf of a federal regulatory program.72

Instead, state and local

governments must have a meaningful choice regarding whether to
implement a federal directive.73 Further, the federal government may not
compel local governments to subsidize private companies, 74 and may not
require a state or local government to transfer its property to benefit a
75
private company.
Additionally, the federal government may not take local government
property without compensation.76 The Fifth Amendment prohibits the
federal government from taking private property "for public use without
just compensation. 77 The Takings Clause78 prohibits the federal

government from freely taking either privately owned property 79 or the

66. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992).
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
68. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
69. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
70. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557-58.
71. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-22 (1997).
72. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992).
73. See id. at 173-74.
74. See id.
at 175.
75. See Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1329 (D.N.M. 2002).
76. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 26 (1984); United States v. Carmack, 329
U.S. 230, 242 (1946).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
78. See id.; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336
(2002).
79. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 507-08 (1979); United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
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public property of state and local governments.8 0 Further, the Takings
Clause protects rights-of-way8' and even limited property rights, such as
the right to exclude others, so that the federal government may not
authorize a physical occupation
of the property of another without
82
paying just compensation.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that if a private company occupies
public rights-of-way, it must pay just compensation to the owner even if
the occupation is authorized by the federal government. 83 When a private
company uses public rights-of-way, it asserts control over a certain
portion of the space that could be used by others.8 4 Any amount of
physical presence on private or public property could constitute a taking
that deserves just compensation under the Takings Clause. 85 Wires,
cables, and transmission boxes installed by telecommunications
companies have a permanent physical presence.8 6 Thus, their occupation
of public property without just compensation
could be a taking, even if it
87
is authorized by the federal government.
Just compensation is generally calculated to be the fair market value
of the subject property 88 under the rationale that compensation should
put the owner in as good a position as before the taking. 89 The U.S.
Supreme Court has measured this amount by the owner's loss rather than
the taker's gain, 90 and has applied this doctrine to different forms of
infringed property interests, including easements 91 and the right to
80. See W. Union Tel. Co. v. City of Richmond, 224 U.S. 160, 169 (1912); City of St. Louis v.
W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 101 (1892).
81. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 429-30 (1982); W.
Union Tel. Co. v. Penn. R.R., 195 U.S. 540, 570 (1904).
82. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding that Congress had
the right to grant public access through privately-owned waters, but that just compensation must be

paid to the property owners).
83. See City ofSt. Louis, 148 U.S. at 100-01.

84. See id. at 99.
85. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430.

86. See id. at 428-29; see also Jennifer L. Worstell, Section 253 of the TelecommunicationsAct of
1996: A PermanentPhysical Appropriationof PrivateProperty That Must Be Justly Compensated,
50 FED. COMM. L.J. 441,463 (1998).

87. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426; Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1872).
88. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984). Fair market value is "what a
willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller." United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374

(1943).
89. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
90. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
91. See id.

Fair and Reasonable Compensation
exclude others.92 For public property, the "substitute facilities" doctrine
is often used to calculate just compensation if the fair market value is not
readily ascertainable. 93 Under this94 doctrine, compensation is the
replacement cost of similar property.
The nature of the local government's property interest under state law
influences the type of compensation it may require when the federal
government takes, or authorizes the taking of, a public right-of-way. 95 If
the local government owns the property in fee,96 it has the same rights as
a private property owner, and can seek fair market value for taken
property. 97 In contrast, if the local government has an easement, 98
compensation is typically based on the value of the easement. 99 Finally,
if the local government holds the right-of-way in trust for the public, it
can require compensation based on the public's right to control the
property. 10 0
It has been argued that local governments have a duty to require
compensation from private companies because not to do so would be
inadequate management of a public resource.10t Many state constitutions
support this principle by prohibiting gifting of public resources. 10 2 The
federal government follows this principle as well. For example, when the
federal government grants access
to its own rights-of-way, it requires
10 3
fair rental value for the property.
In sum, state law grants local governments property interests in
rights-of-way to manage on behalf of the public. Telecommunications
companies pay fees and obtain franchises to access these rights-of-

92. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
93. See California v. United States, 395 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1968).
94. See id.
95. See California, 395 F.2d at 264.
96. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 10, § 30.32.
97. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 26 (1984).
98. See Mayor of Baltimore v. United States, 147 F.2d 786, 789 (4th Cir. 1945).
99. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946); see also Caporal v. United States, 577
F.2d 113, 117 (10th Cir. 1978).
100. City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 99-100 (1893).
101. See Nat'l Ass'n of Telecomm. Officers & Advisors, Policy Statements for Communication
and the Public Interest, available at http://www.natoa.org/public/articles/details.html?id=25 (last
visited June 19, 2003).
102. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 6; CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8;
WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.
103. See 43 C.F.R. § 2803.1-2 (2002).
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way. 104 Although the state government can preempt the authority of local
governments over rights-of-way, the federal government cannot because
it does not hold the same sovereign position over local governments as
does the state. Further, if the federal government tried to assert this
power, it could result in an unconstitutional taking of local government
property, or commandeering local governments into administering
federal regulatory programs.
II.

THE 1996 ACT PRESERVED LOCAL GOVERNMENT
AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE COMPENSATION FOR USE OF
PUBLIC RIGHTS-OF-WAY

With passage of the 1996 Act,' 05 Congress clarified federal regulation
of telecommunications providers 10 6 while simultaneously protecting the
franchise authority of local governments.' 0 7 The text and legislative
history of § 253(c) expressly preserve the franchising authority of local
governments, and allow local governments to require "fair and
reasonable compensation" for use of their rights-of-way. 0 8 However,
because Congress left "fair and reasonable compensation" undefined,
litigation has ensued over the appropriate nature and extent of this
compensation.
A.

The TelecommunicationsAct of 1996

Congress passed the 1996 Act "to promote competition and reduce
regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality service for
American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid
deployment of new telecommunications technologies."'0 9 The 1996 Act
is a comprehensive federal regulatory program that clarifies federal
authority over different communications providers.
The 1996 Act provides regulatory schemes for various technologies 10
and defines the services within its purview. "Telecommunications" is
104. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 10, § 34.37.
105. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-614 (2000)).
106. See City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001).
107. See City of Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 1999).
108. 47 U.S.C. § 253(c); see infra Part lI.B.
109. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
110. For example, Title II addresses telecommunications technologies and sets forth common
carrier requirements, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-276, and Title VI incorporates the previous Cable

Fair and Reasonable Compensation
"the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of
information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or
content of the information as sent and received.""' This definition
encompasses both telephone service and the ability to access the internet2
over telephone lines, but not the provision of internet service itself."
"Telecommunications service" is defined as "the offering of
telecommunications for a fee directly to the public ... regardless of the
facilities used." ' 1 3 A company that provides telecommunications
'
services is a "telecommunications carrier." 14
Despite introducing many changes to federal telecommunications
regulation, the 1996 Act preserved local franchising authority.' The
1996 Act distinguishes between the regulatory authority of local
governments, which it largely preempts, 116 and the proprietary rights of
local governments, 17 which it preserves." 8 For example, the 1996 Act
preempts local government franchising authority by compelling local
governments to allow companies to provide telecommunications
services. 19 At the same time, the 1996 Act recognizes the authority of
local governments to require franchises 120 and to charge franchise fees of
up to five percent of the gross revenue of cable television companies.'12
Further, the 1996 Act preserves local government authority over
companies that provide video programming over telephone lines
(OVS). 122 Although OVS operators are exempt from federal franchise
requirements, they remain subject to local franchise authority. 23 Thus,
the 1996 Act preserves the franchise authority of local governments by
ensuring their ability to assess and require fees.
Communications Act with regard to the regulation of cable television, see id.
§ § 521-573.
111. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43).
112. See California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 923-25 (9th Cir. 1994).
113. 47 U.S.C. § 153(46).
114. Id. § 153(44).
115. See City of Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 1999).
116. See City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001).
117. Proprietary interest in this context refers to the obligation of local governments to hold the
property in trust for its citizens. See City of Gary v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ind.
2000).

118. See City of Dallas, 165 F.3d at 347.
119. See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a).
120. Seeid. § 541(a)(1).
121. See id. § 542(b).
122. See id. § 573(c)(2)(B).
123. See City of Dallas, 165 F.3d at 347.
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Section 253 of the 1996 Act PreservesLocal Government Authority
to Require Compensationfor Use of Public Rights-of-Way

Although § 253 of the 1996 Act preserves local authority over public
rights-of-way, it also limits local governments' regulatory authority over
telecommunications providers.1 24 In relevant part, § 253 reads:
Removal of Barriers to Entry
(a) IN GENERAL - No State or local statute or regulation, or
other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the
effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any
interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.
(c) STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY Nothing in this section affects the authority of a State or local
government to manage the public rights-of-way or to require
fair and reasonable compensation from telecommunications
providers, on a competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory
basis, for use of public rights-of-way on a nondiscriminatory
basis, if the compensation
required is publicly disclosed by such
25
government. 1

Thus, section 253 contains both an express recognition of local
government's authority to require compensation for use of public rightsof-way, and a limitation of local government's authority to regulate
telecommunications providers.
Subsection 253(c) expressly allows local governments to obtain "fair
and reasonable compensation" from telecommunications providers for
their use of public rights-of-way. This provision was included in
response to concerns of House 126 and Senate2 7 members that local

governments must retain their authority over public rights-of-way. In the
House, the co-sponsors of the amendment that became § 253(c) 128 did
not want local governments to subsidize private telecommunications
companies' use of public rights-of-way. 2 9 Instead, they preferred that
124. See 47 U.S.C. § 253.
125. Id. (emphasis added). Section 253(b) addresses state regulatory authority with regard to such

issues as universal service and public safety. Id.
126. See H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 75-76 (1995).

127. See 141 CONG. REC. S8174 (daily ed. June 12, 1995).
128. See GST Tucson v. City of Tucson, 950 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D. Ariz. 1996).

129. See 141 CONG. REC. H8460 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995). Congressman Joe Barton of Texas
presented statistics indicating that local governments spend approximately $100 billion per year
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cities set the amount of compensation without interference from the
federal government.' 30 Congressman Barton stated that the amendment
"guarantees that cities and local governments have the right.., to set the
compensation level for use of [their] right-of-way."' 131 The House
adopted the amendment despite concern that allowing cities to charge a
percentage of gross revenue for use of their rights-of-way would stifle
the competition that the 1996 Act was designed to133promote. 32 The
Senate adopted a similar amendment to the House Act.
After reconciling the amendments, Congress enacted § 253 without
defining "fair and reasonable compensation."'' 34 In the absence of a clear
definition, telecommunications providers have suggested that courts
interpret § 253(c) in a similar manner as the section of the 1996 Act that
regulates pole attachments. 35 The Pole Attachment Act includes
language that requires utilities to charge other utilities "just and
reasonable" rates for use of their poles. 136 The Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) is authorized to set these rates,' 37 and has limited
38
payment to the first utility's direct costs for providing the attachment.'
Some telecommunications providers have taken the position that courts
should interpret the "fair and reasonable" language of § 253(c) similarly,
and have argued by analogy that cities should
recover only direct costs
39
associated with use of public rights-of-way. 1
However, courts have not reached a consensus on the basis on which
to calculate fair and reasonable compensation. 140 Courts have adopted
either a "cost-recovery" approach or a "totality of the circumstances"
approach.14' Under the cost-recovery approach, courts have limited local
maintaining public rights-of-way but only received $3 billion from the private companies that used
them. See id.
130. Congressman Barton stated that in a "free market society, the companies should have to pay
a fair and reasonable rate to use public property." Id.
131. Id.

132. See id.
133. See 141 CONG. REC. S8431 (daily ed. June 15, 1995).
134. See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd, 206
F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
135. See id.
136. 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1) (2000).
137. See id.
138. See FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1987).
139. See City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 788.
140. See infra Part III.

141. See Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1327 (D.N.M. 2002) (describing
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governments to recovering only the direct costs caused by
telecommunications providers using public rights-of-way. 42 In contrast,
under the totality of the circumstances approach, courts look at various
factors to determine whether the 43
compensation required by the local
government is fair and reasonable.
In sum, the 1996 Act simultaneously affirmed federal regulatory
authority over telecommunications providers while preserving the power
of local governments to require compensation for public rights-of-way.
The text and legislative history of § 253(c) show that Congress intended
to give telecommunications companies a permissive grant to access local
rights-of-way subject to local government conditions, including the
power to charge fair and reasonable compensation for use of the rightsof-way. However, Congress did not define "fair and reasonable"
compensation in § 253(c), leaving it up to the courts to determine the
extent of local government compensation setting authority.
III. CASES INTERPRETING THE 1996 ACT HAVE REACHED
DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS REGARDING LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY
Since passage of the 1996 Act, telecommunications providers have
brought suit under the Supremacy Clause 144 and under § 253145 when
cities have required them to obtain franchises or satisfy other
requirements in exchange for use of public rights-of-way. 146 Decisions
made under § 253 have been very fact-specific, 147 and courts' analyses
49
148
have differed depending on state law and the technologies at issue.
these approaches).
142. See Grant County v. Qwest Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1251 (D.N.M. 2001); Bell Atl.-Md.
v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805, 818-19 (D. Md. 1999), vacated on other grounds by
212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir. 2000).
143. See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000); Qwest
Communications v. City of Berkeley, 208 F.R.D. 288, 294 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
144. See City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001); City of Santa Fe,
224 F. Supp. 2d at 1316.
145. See City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d at 624.
146. See City of Auburn, 260 F.3d at 1175; City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d at 621; Cox
Communications v. City of San Marcos, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1275 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
147. See City of Berkeley, 208 F.R.D. at 294.
148. For example, state law may differ with regard to the legal status of public rights-of-way, and
the amount of compensation local governments may require. See infra Part III.A.
149. See City of Auburn, 260 F.3d at 1174 (reaching different conclusions for wireless versus
wireline facilities).
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However, these decisions can be divided into certain categories. One
category includes courts that have considered the effect of state law on
compensation and those that have not. Another includes courts that have
interpreted § 253(c) to establish a "cost-recovery" approach, limiting
cities to recovering only direct costs,

50

and courts that have adopted a

"totality of the circumstances" approach
compensation is fair and reasonable. 151
A.

to

determine

if the

Some Courts Have ConsideredState Law When Deciding Whether
a FranchiseFee Is Fairand Reasonable Under § 253(c)

State law can impact the analysis of a particular telecommunications
franchise agreement in two ways. First, state law determines the nature
of a local government's interest in the public rights-of-way, 152 thereby
influencing a court's determination of whether compensation is fair and
reasonable. 53 Second, a state statute can prescribe the type of
compensation that local governments can require of telecommunications
providers.1 54 Although some courts have grounded
their § 253(c)
55
not.1
have
others
law,
state
of
consideration
in
analysis
Courts that have considered state law as part of their § 253(c) analysis
have done so in different ways. Some courts have merely acknowledged
state law, without relying heavily on it in their analyses. For example, in
Bell Atlantic-Maryland v. Prince George's County,156 the court noted
without further discussion that the county was a home-rule county,
57
authorized to exercise certain powers under the state constitution.
Similarly, in City ofRome v. Verizon Communications,158 the court noted
150. See id. at 1175; Grant County v. Qwest Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1249 (D.N.M. 2001).
151. See City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d at 624-25.
152. See supra Part I.A.
153. See N.J. Payphone Ass'n v. Town of W. New York, 130 F. Supp. 2d 631, 638 (D.N.J. 2001),
aff'd, 299 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2002).
154. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-5.5-101 (2001); see also Bellsouth Telecomms. v. City of
Coral Springs, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1309 (S.D. Fla. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub noma.
Bellsouth Telecomms. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169 (11 th Cir. 2001); City of Denver v.
Qwest Corp., 18 P.3d 748, 757 (Colo. 2001); People v. Kerr, 27 N.Y. 188, 213 (1863); City of
Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel. & Tel. Co., 59 N.E. 781, 785 (Ohio 1901); Bellsouth Telecomms. v.
City of Orangeburg, 522 S.E.2d 804, 808 (S.C. 1999).
155. See TCG N.Y. v. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2002); PECO Energy Co. v.
Township of Haverford, No. 99-4766, 1999 WL 1240941 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1999).
156. 49 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Md. 1999).
157. See id. at 807.
158. 240 F. Supp. 2d 176 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
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the possibility that the defendant telephone company had state
authorization to occupy the public rights-of-way, 59 but then analyzed
the franchise fee under § 253 without considering the issue.
In contrast, other courts have focused heavily on state law to
determine the source of local government authority to require
compensation under § 253(c). For example, in New Jersey Payphone
Association v. Town of West New York,' 60 the town argued that it could
require a fee from pay telephone providers from using the public rightsof-way based on its ownership of the property.' The court rejected this
argument, finding that under state law the town held an easement in the
right-of-way as a public trustee, which only granted it police powers
over the property. 162 Thus, the court found the city could not exert the
63
same control over the streets as it could if it owned them in fee.
Similarly, in Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe,'64 the court considered the
state constitution and the New Mexico Telecommunications Act to
identify the city's source of franchise authority before it conducted its
§ 253(c) analysis. 165 After the court determined that the city owned the
public rights-of-way and had the power to enter into franchises under
provision in
state law, 166 it concluded that the particular franchise
67
question was unreasonable under the circumstances. 1
Other courts have analyzed state law to determine the appropriate
limits of local government authority without considering the nature of
the property interest held by the local government. For example, in
Bellsouth Telecommunications v. City of Coral Springs,168 the court
determined that the authority of the state Public Service Commission
preempted most local authority to franchise telecommunications
companies.169 However, because both state and federal law allowed for a
collection of a reasonable fee for right-of-way use, the city could require
159. See id. at 177.
160. 130 F. Supp. 2d 631 (D.N.J. 2001), affid, 299 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2002).
161. See id. at 638.
162. See id.

163. See id.
164. 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (D.N.M. 2002).
165. See id. at 1319-20.
166. See id. at 1322.

167. See id. at 1331.
168. 42 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (S.D. Fla. 1999), affid in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Bellsouth

Telecomms. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169 (11 th Cir. 2001).
169. See id. at 1308.
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up to a one percent franchise fee on the company's gross revenue. 7 °
Similarly, in City of Denver v. Qwest Corp.,'7 ' the Colorado State
Supreme Court held that, although Denver was a home-rule municipality
under the Colorado Constitution, 72 its franchise ordinance was
preempted in its entirety by the state telecommunications act, which
allowed telecommunications providers "to occupy public rights-of-way
without additional authorization" from local governments. 73
'
B.

Courts Have Adopted Different Analytic Approaches to the
Meaning of Fairand Reasonable Compensation Under § 253(c)

Courts are divided over the extent of local government authority
under § 253(c), with some courts adopting a very narrow "costrecovery" approach, 174 and other courts allowing broader compensation
under a "totality of the circumstances" approach.175 The cost-recovery

approach limits the local government's compensation to the costs it
incurred from physical impacts to public rights-of-way.'

76

Courts

adopting this approach usually preclude compensation based on gross
revenue as a method for cities to recover costs.177 In contrast, the totality
of the circumstances approach allows local governments to base their
compensation
on factors other than actual costs, including gross
78
revenue. 1

170. See id. at 1309.
171. 18 P.3d 748 (Colo. 2001).
172. See id. at 754.
173. Id. at 752.
174. See Grant County v. Qwest Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1249 (D.N.M. 2001); PECO
Energy Co. v. Township of Haverford, No. 99-4766, 1999 WL 1240941, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20,
1999); Bell Atl.-Md. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805, 817 (D. Md. 1999), vacated on
other grounds by 212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir. 2000).
175. See Qwest Corp. v. City of Portland, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1258-59 (D. Or. 2002); TCG
Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd, 206 F.3d 618 (6th
Cir. 2000); Bellsouth Telecomms. v. City of Orangeburg, 522 S.E.2d 804, 808 (S.C. 1999).
176. See Grant County, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1251. This analysis appears to derive from decisions
that have interpreted franchise provisions as inconsistent with federal law if they attempt to regulate
telecommunications providers themselves, rather than just their use of the public rights-of-way. For
example, the Ninth Circuit struck down ordinances that required telecommunications companies to
submit information regarding their financial qualifications as insufficiently related to right-of-way
management. See City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001).
177. See Grant County, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1249; Township of Haverford, 1999 WL 1240941, at
*8.

178. See Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1328 (D.N.M. 2002).
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Some Courts Have Adopted a Cost-Recovery Approach to Fairand
Reasonable Compensation

Although later vacated on other grounds by the Fourth Circuit,' 79 Bell
Atlantic-Maryland v. Prince George's County180 remains a significant
development in the judicial interpretation of § 253(c). Prince George's
County, Maryland required a telephone company to obtain a franchise
and pay a percentage of its gross revenue when it installed lines in the
county's right-of-way.' 81 The federal district court held that the county
could require compensation, but the fees had to be directly related to
maintenance and improvement of the public rights-of-way, 82 otherwise
the fees would be a "barrier to entry" prohibited by § 253(a).' 83 The
court held that "fair and reasonable" compensation must be based on the
degree of physical use by the company, rather than on a percentage of its
gross revenue. 184 Thus, the court adopted a "cost-recovery" approach to
§ 253(c). The decision turned on the court's interpretation of the phrase
"use of the public rights-of-way," which it defined as "physically
impact[ing] the public rights-of-way by installing, modifying, or
removing telecommunications lines and facilities. '"
Although the Prince George's County decision was later vacated, it
influenced other courts to hold that "cost-recovery" was the only
permissible form of compensation under § 253(c), and to reject
compensation based on a percentage of gross revenue. For example, in
PECO Energy Co. v. Township of Haverford,186 a Pennsylvania federal
district court struck down an ordinance requiring a telecommunications
provider to pay four different fees to string fiber-optic cable on utility
poles in the town's streets. 8 7 The court held that the town had not
adequately demonstrated the relationship between the fees charged and

179. See Bell Atl.-Md. v. Prince George's County, 212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir. 2000) (vacating and
remanding with an admonition for the district court to consider the state law questions at issue
before deciding the federal claims).
180. 49 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Md. 1999), vacated on other grounds by 212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir.

2000).
181. See id. at 807-08.
182. See id. at 817.
183. See id. at 814.
184. See id. at 818.
185. See id. at 819 (emphasis added).
186. No. 99-4766, 1999 WL 1240941 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1999).
187. See id. at * 1-2.
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the use of public rights-of-way. 188 Further, the court held that a fee based
on revenue "by definition" could not be compensation for use of the
public rights-of-way.1 89 A federal district court in New Mexico reached a
similar conclusion in Grant County v. Qwest Corp.,190 and invalidated a
county "user fee" on telecommunications providers in the public rightsof-way because it was revenue-based.19' The court held that although the
county was not precluded from charging a fee, the fee must "directly
relate to the County's expenses incurred in managing the actual physical
use" of the right-of-way. 92 Without further explanation, the court stated
that a revenue-based fee did not meet this criterion.193
2.

Other Courts Have Adopted a Totality of the Circumstances
Approach to Fairand Reasonable Compensation

In contrast, other courts have upheld local governments' rights to
obtain broader compensation for telecommunications providers' use of
public rights-of-way under § 253(c), adopting a "totality of the
circumstances" model.194 Under this approach, courts consider a number
of factors when deciding whether to uphold compensation as fair and
reasonable. 195 These factors include the local government's authority
under state law, 196 what other providers are willing to pay for similar use
of the public rights-of-way, 97 and whether the telecommunications
98
provider previously had agreed to pay similar compensation.'
A year after the Grant County decision adopting the cost-recovery
approach, another New Mexico district court held otherwise and adopted
the totality of the circumstances approach to determine whether a
franchise fee was fair and reasonable. In Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa

188. See id. at *7.
189. See id. at *8.
190. 169 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (D.N.M. 2001).
191. Seeid. at 1251.
192. See id.

193. See id.
194. See Qwest Corp. v. City of Portland, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1258-59 (D. Or. 2002); TCG
Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd, 206 F.3d 618 (6th
Cir. 2000); Bellsouth Telecomms. v. City of Orangeburg, 522 S.E.2d 804, 808 (S.C. 1999).
195. See City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 789-90.
196. See Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1318 (D.N.M. 2002).
197. See id. at 1329; City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 790.
198. See City of Dearborn,206 F.3d at 625; City of Portland,200 F. Supp. 2d at 1259.
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Fe,' 99 the court recognized the city's right to charge franchise fees based

on its status as a home-rule municipality. 200 The court noted three
advantages to the totality of the circumstances approach. First,
compensation can be related to actual use of public rights-of-way
without being cost-based. 20 ' Second, the approach allows courts to give
appropriate attention to variations in state and local law. 20 2 Finally, it is
consistent with U.S. Supreme
Court jurisprudence concerning the limits
20 3
of congressional authority.
The South Carolina State Supreme Court also adopted the totality of
the circumstances approach, but considered different factors in Bellsouth
Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Orangeburg. 20 4 The court held that
the city had the authority, under both § 253 and state law, to require a
telephone company to compensate it by paying a five percent grossrevenue fee to place poles and wires in the city's streets.20 5 The court
reasoned that because the company paid the fee in exchange for using
the public rights-of-way, the compensation was fair and reasonable for
"the franchise's value as a business asset to the franchisee." ' 20 6 The court
also upheld the fee because the other telecommunications franchisee in
the city paid the same percentage of its gross revenue in exchange for
right-of-way access.20 7
In TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn,20 8 the Sixth Circuit held that a
franchise fee equal to four percent of the telecommunications provider's
gross revenue was fair and reasonable compensation because it was
merited by the circumstances. 20 9 The court considered the amount of
right-of-way used, the fact that other providers had agreed to pay similar
fees, and that the provider had previously agreed to pay the fee.210 Other

199. 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (D.N.M. 2002).
200. See id. at 1321. The court thus distinguished its holding from that of the Grant County court
because New Mexico counties lack express authority to require such fees. See id. at 1321-22.
201. See id.at 1327. However, the court struck down the fee at issue as unreasonable when
compared to the previous fee. Id.
at 1329-30.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 1328.
204.
205.
206.
207.

522 S.E.2d 804 (S.C. 1999).
See id. at 808.
See id.
See id. at 807.

208. 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
209. See id. at 625.
210. See id.
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courts have agreed with the City of Dearborn court and considered the
last factor, that the telecommunications provider had been conducting
business while paying the "allegedly prohibitive" fee, to be persuasive in
rejecting arguments by telecommunications providers that the fees were
prohibitive. 2'
As these cases illustrate, courts have used various approaches to
analyze franchise fees under § 253(c). Not every court has looked to
state law to determine the source of local government authority, and
courts have differed over the proper interpretation of the words "use"
and "compensation." Some courts have concluded that compensation is
limited to the costs incurred by a city for a telecommunications
provider's physical use of the public rights-of-way, such as repair of
street cuts or inspection fees.212 Other courts have interpreted "use"
broadly as any presence in the right-of-way, and concluded that a city
can require compensation based on a percentage of the
telecommunication provider's gross revenue.213
IV. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS UPHELD LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE
COMPENSATION FOR USE OF PUBLIC RIGHTS-OF-WAY
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the U.S. Supreme
Court addressed challenges to local government control of public rightsof-way in cases involving telegraph companies. 214 Although the
companies had received a congressional grant to occupy public rightsof-way, the Court held that this grant was subordinate to the right of

211. See Qwest Corp. v. City of Portland, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1258-59 (D. Or. 2002); City of
Dallas v. Metro. Fiber Systems of Dallas, No. CIV.A.398CV2128R, 2000 WL 198104, *5 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 17, 2000); AT&T Communications v. City of Eugene, 35 P.3d 1029, 1048 (Or. Ct. App.
2001).
212. See Grant County v. Qwest Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1249 (D.N.M. 2001); PECO
Energy Co. v. Township of Haverford, No. 99-4766, 1999 WL 1240941, *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20,
1999); Bell Atl.-Md. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805, 817 (D. Md. 1999), vacated on
other grounds by 212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir. 2000).
213. See City of Portland,200 F. Supp. 2d at 1258-59; TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F.
Supp. 2d 785, 789 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd, 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000); Bellsouth Telecomms. v.
City of Orangeburg, 522 S.E.2d 804, 808 (S.C. 1999).
214. See generally Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919) (holding that
a city's imposition of a telephone pole fee was not a burden on interstate commerce); W. Union Tel.
Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 187 U.S. 419 (1903) (holding that a city could charge telegraph
companies reasonable license and permitting fees); City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S.
92 (1893) (holding that a city could charge reasonable fees for use of public rights-of-way).
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local governments to condition access to and receive compensation for
use of their rights-of-way.2 1 5 More recent cases have affirmed this
precedent with respect to modern technologies.2 16
In 1866, Congress passed the Post Roads Act (Telegraph Act),
granting telegraph companies "the right to construct, maintain and
operate lines of telegraph through and over any portion of the public
domain.., over and along any of the military or post roads of the
United States, '2 7 including routes in cities and towns.2 18 When a later
Act of Congress declared "[a]ll public roads and highways ... to be post
routes,, 2 19 it appeared that Congress had granted telegraph companies
with free access to all public rights-of-way in the nation. Yet, cities
continued to require telegraph companies to obtain franchises and pay
compensation for access. 220 Telegraph companies claimed that these fees
obstructed their congressionally granted privilege 221 and impermissibly
22
interfered with interstate commerce.22
Ultimately, however, the U.S.
223
Supreme Court interpreted the Telegraph Act as a "permissive" grant,
subordinate to both public and private property rights.224
In City of St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,225 the city sued
Western Union for failing to comply with an ordinance requiring
telegraph companies to pay five dollars per year for each pole in the
public rights-of-way. 226 As a defense, Western Union claimed that the
Telegraph Act of 1866 granted it free right-of-way access.227 The Court
215. See City of Richmond, 249 U.S. at 260-61; Borough of New Hope, 187 U.S. at 427; City of
St. Louis, 148 U.S. at 100.

216. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428-29 (1982); City of
Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 789; City of Gary v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ind.
2000).
217. Act of Congress of July 24, 1866, ch. 230, 14 Stat. 221, quoted in City of St. Louis, 148 U.S.
at 100.

218. See City of St. Louis, 148 U.S. at 100 (quoting 18 Rev. Stat. 768, § 3964).
219. Act of March 1, 1884, 23 Stat. 3, quoted in City of St. Louis, 148 U.S. at 100.
220. See Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 256 (1919); W. Union Tel.
Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 187 U.S. 419, 419 (1903); City ofSt. Louis, 148 U.S. at 95.
221. See City of St. Louis, 148 U.S. at 100.

222. See City of Richmond, 249 U.S. at 256; Atl. & Pac. Tel. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 190 U.S.
160, 162 (1903).
223. See W. Union Tel. Co. v. City of Richmond, 224 U.S. 160, 169 (1912); City of St. Louis, 148

U.S. at 102.
224. See City of St. Louis, 148 U.S. at 100-01.
225. 148 U.S. 92 (1893).
226. Id. at 95.
227. See id. at 100.
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rejected Western Union's argument, 228 characterizing Western Union's
poles and wires as a physical occupation that permanently removed a
portion of land from public use. 229 The Court held that just as an act of
Congress could not authorize a company to occupy private property
without payment, neither could it do so for public property. 230 Thus,
local governments, like individuals, were entitled to "just compensation"
for use of their property. 23' The Court determined that compensation for
the use of public rights-of-way, such as franchise fees, represented
232
payment "in the nature of rental" to the public for use of its property.
Although the fees were charged as rent, the local government could use
the fees for revenue as if they were taxes, 233 and the Court suggested 234
in
dicta that the fees could be based on the company's gross revenue.
Thus, the Court upheld the city's authority to charge the fees, as long as
the amount was not excessive.2 35
In other cases litigated under the Telegraph Act, the Court upheld
various models of compensation. In City of St. Louis, the Court affirmed
basing compensation on a flat rental fee.236 In Western Union Telegraph
Company v. Borough of New Hope,237 the Court upheld a city's "license
fee" for use of its streets, even though it exceeded the city's cost for
providing the service.238 Similarly, in Atlantic & Pacific Telegraph
Company v. City of Philadelphia,239 the Court upheld fees for "the
enforcement of local government supervision,, 240 noting that the city did

228. See id. at 104-05.
229. See id. at 99.
230. See id. at 101.
231. Id. Although the Court did not directly refer to the Fifth Amendment, its use of the phrase
"just compensation" in exchange for a property right indicates that this holding has a constitutional
basis, which was later confirmed in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
428-30 (1982).
232. City of St. Louis, 148 U.S. at 99, 105.
233. See id. at 97.
234. See id. at 98.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 99, 105.
237. 187 U.S. 419 (1903).
238. See id. at 425.
239. 190 U.S. 160 (1903). Although the Second Circuit has suggested that the interpretation of
the "dormant Commerce Clause" in this case has since been repudiated by the U.S. Supreme Court,
the propositions cited here are still valid. TCG New York v. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d 67, 78
(2d Cir. 2002).
240. City of Philadelphia, 190 U.S. at 164.
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not have to precisely estimate the cost to provide the services, but could
241
set the charge at a reasonable amount to cover its expenses.
In determining local governments' authority over telegraph
companies, the Court recognized the importance of state law.242 In
PostalTelegraph-Cable Company v. City of Richmond,24 3 the Court held
that the city's "police power ' 244 under Virginia law2 45 was sufficient
authority to impose an annual charge per utility pole on a telegraph
company. 246 Further, in City of St. Louis, the Court stated that, "under
the constitution and laws of Missouri, the city of St. Louis has the full
control of its streets, and in this respect represents the public in relation
thereto., 247 Thus, the Court acknowledged that cities could charge rent
based on their interest in holding the land in trust for the public.248
The U.S. Supreme Court and other courts have applied the principles
of City of St. Louis in cases involving more modem technologies.2 49 In
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.,25° the Court examined
a New York state law authorizing cable television companies to install
25
facilities on privately owned buildings, in exchange for one dollar. 1
Characterizing the presence of the cable, although minimal, as a
"permanent physical occupation," the Court held that the law effected a
taking under the Fifth Amendment and that the state could not prevent
the payment of just compensation. 252 Applying the "physical
occupation" principle it recognized a century before in City of St.

241. Id. at 164-65.
242. Although one commentator has suggested that the Court misunderstood the nature of the

cities' interest in the public rights-of-way in these early telegraph cases and that this undermines
their validity, see Gardner F. Gillespie, Rights-of-Way Redux: Municipal Fees on
Telecommunications Companies and Cable Operators, 107 DICK. L. REV. 209, 219 (2002), as

discussed in this Part, the language of the decisions indicates otherwise.
243. 249 U.S. 252 (1919).
244. Id. at 259.
245. Id. at 257.
246. id. at 256.
247. City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 100 (1893).
248. Id. at 99-100.
249. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428-29 (1982); TCG
Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789-90 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd, 206 F.3d 618 (6th
Cir. 2000); City of Gary v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ind. 2000).
250. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
251. See id. at 423-24.
252. See id. at 421.
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Louis,253 the Court confirmed that the action was a taking even though
254
the law merely authorized, rather than accomplished, the occupation.
Although the cable box, like the telegraph wires at issue in City of St.
Louis, occupied "relatively insubstantial amounts of space, 255 the
property owner, like the city in City of St. Louis, could require
reasonable compensation. 256
Lower courts have also applied the principle that a private company
cannot occupy public property without compensating the local
government in the telecommunications context. In TCG Detroit v. City
of Dearborn,257 a Michigan district court relied on City of St. Louis to
hold that there was "nothing inappropriate" about the city charging rent
for the telecommunications provider's facilities on city property.2 58
Similarly, in City of Gary v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., the Indiana
State Supreme Court cited City of St. Louis in affirming a city's
authority to require compensation for private use of
public property
259
"irrespective of the label placed on the compensation.,
In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Telegraph Act
established three important principles concerning local governments'
authority over public rights-of-way. First, local governments have the
authority to require compensation from private companies using public
right-of-way, even if the companies are acting pursuant to a
congressional grant. 260 Second, the compensation can take many forms,
including rental and license fees, and still be reasonable. 261 Third, in
determining the appropriate amount of compensation, it is important to
consider state law. 262 These cases have had a continuing vitality. The
principle that a small amount of physical intrusion is a taking that
requires just compensation was affirmed in Loretto, 263 and the idea that

253. See id. at 429.
254. See id. at 429 n.6.
255. See id. at 430.
256. See id. at 421.
257. 16 F. Supp. 2d 785 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd, 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
258. Id. at 789.
259. City of Gary v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ind. 2000).
260. City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 101 (1893).
261. At. & Pac. Tel. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1903); W. Union Tel. Co.
v. Borough ofNew Hope, 187 U.S. 419, 425 (1903); City ofSt. Louis, 148 U.S. at 99, 105.
262. Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 257 (1919); City of St. Louis, 148
U.S. at 100.
263. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428-29 (1982).
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local governments can charge rental for their property has been applied
264
by courts in the telecommunications context.
V.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ARE ENTITLED TO REQUIRE
FAIR AND REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR USE OF
PUBLIC RIGHTS-OF-WAY

Local governments, in accordance with state law and established
federal doctrine, are entitled to require compensation from
telecommunications providers for use of public rights-of-way beyond the
costs incurred from the physical impact and direct regulation. When
evaluating a franchise fee under § 253(c), courts should examine state
law for the source of local government franchising authority, and then
use a totality of the circumstances approach to determine if the
compensation is fair and reasonable. The text and legislative history of
§ 253(c) 265 and analogous U.S. Supreme Court precedent2 66 support this
approach. Courts that narrowly interpret § 253(c) to allow only direct
cost-recovery potentially permit both a taking of local government
property without just compensation,267 and a commandeering of local
governments to implement a federal regulatory program.26 8
A.

Approaches to the Issue ofFairand Reasonable Compensation
Can Be Generally GroupedInto Four Categories

When analyzing a particular ordinance under § 253(c), courts have
placed varying levels of importance on state law. 269 Courts have also
adopted one of two approaches: a cost-recovery approach, which limits
the local government's reimbursement to its direct costs, 270 or a totality
of the circumstances approach, which considers a variety of factors and
allows more expansive compensation. 27 1 These inconsistent approaches
have resulted in four analytic frameworks courts use to determine if

264. See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789-90 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd,
206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000); City of Gary v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ind. 2000).
265. See supra Part l.B.
266. See supra Part IV.
267. See supra Part I.A.
268. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.

269. See supra Part III.A.
270. See supra notes 176-93 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 194-211 and accompanying text.

Fair and Reasonable Compensation
compensation is fair and reasonable under § 253. The following matrix
represents the possible approaches and provides an example of each:

Considers State Law

Totality of the
Cost Recovery
Circumstances
City of Santa Fe 272 Prince2George's
73
County

Does Not Consider
State Law

City of

Dearborn274

Township of
Haverford275

These inconsistent approaches create confusion for local governments
and telecommunications providers. The text of § 253(c), its legislative
history, and analogous U.S. Supreme Court precedent dictate an
approach that first analyzes the relevant state law and then considers the
totality of circumstances surrounding the franchise agreement to
determine if the compensation is fair and reasonable.
B.

Courts Should Examine State Law When Interpreting "Fairand
Reasonable Compensation" Under § 253(c)

To analyze "fair and reasonable compensation" under § 253(c), courts
should first examine state law to determine the source of the city's
franchise authority. The text of § 253(c) states that "[n]othing in this
section affects the authority ... of local government[s]. 276 Thus,
§ 253(c) expressly preserves local government authority to require
compensation. Such authority invariably derives from state law, because
state law governs the nature of local governments' property interest in

272. 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (D.N.M. 2002). The Santa Fe court held that the local government had
authority to require franchise fees under the state constitution, id. at 1318, and then examined the
totality of the circumstances to see if the particular fee was reasonable, id. at 1329.

273. 49 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Md. 1999), vacated on other grounds by 212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir.
2000). The Prince George's County court recognized the county's authority to require fees from its
status as a "home-rule" county, id. at 807, but then adopted a cost-recovery approach to invalidate
the fee under federal law, id. at 817-18.
274. 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000). The City of Dearborncourt only examined the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the franchise fee and did not consider the city's authority to impose such
a fee. Id. at 624-25.
275. No. 99-4766, 1999 WL 1240941 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1999). The Township of Haverfordcourt
adopted a cost-recovery approach but did not conduct the initial step of finding the authority for the
town to impose the fee. Id. at *6-7.
276. 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2000).
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their rights-of-way 277 and their ability to franchise. 278 An initial inquiry
into state law is necessary to provide courts with a basis for interpreting
whether the compensation is fair and reasonable.
State law governs local government authority over public rights-ofway. 279 If a local government asserts a right to receive compensation
based on its interest in the rights-of-way, a court should know the nature
280
of the interest to determine whether the compensation is appropriate.
In this context, it is important whether the local government owns the
right-of-way in fee, has an easement, or holds the property in trust for
the public. 28' If a court attempts to analyze an ordinance without
understanding the character of the local government's property interest
under state law, it will lack the necessary foundation to evaluate the
reasonableness of the compensation.
Furthermore, the state may have a telecommunications statute that
limits or proscribes the type or amount of compensation that the local
government can require. 12 For example, in City of Coral Springs, the
court held that under state law, only franchise fees equal to or less than
one percent of the telecommunication provider's gross revenue were
valid, an amount the court held was also fair and reasonable under
federal law.283 Likewise, in City of Denver the court held that a local
franchise was completely preempted by state law, so a § 253(c) analysis
was unnecessary to determine whether the compensation was fair and
reasonable.284 If the City of Denver and City of Coral Springs courts had
not evaluated the fees in the context of state law, they might have held
that the fee was "fair and reasonable" even if it violated state law.
Furthermore, principles of federalism require courts to examine local
authority under state law for § 253(c) analysis. 285 Cases that interpret
§ 253(c) without proper analysis of the local government's authority
277. See supra Part I.A.
278. See supra Part I.B.
279. See supra Part I.A.
280. See N.J. Payphone Ass'n v. Town of W. New York, 130 F. Supp. 2d 631, 638 (D.N.J. 2001),
aff'd, 299 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2002); see also supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
281. See N.J. Payphone, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 638; see also McQUILLIN, supra note 10, § 30.37;
supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.

282. See supranotes 58-65 and accompanying text.
283. Bellsouth Telecomms. v. City of Coral Springs, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1309 (S.D. Fla. 1999),
aff'd in part and revd in part sub nom. Bellsouth Telecomms. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d
1169 (1 Ith Cir. 2001).
284. 18 P.3d 748, 758 (Colo. 2001).
285. See Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1317 (D.N.M. 2002).
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under state law 286 allow the federal government to fill what is more
properly the role of the states. The federal government has limited,
enumerated powers,287 and all other powers are reserved to the states or
the people.288 Local government authority over franchises and public
rights-of-way is governed by state law, 289 and the federal government
can neither attribute nor ignore local powers that are removed or
conferred by the states. To do so could lead to unconstitutional results,
because the court would be granting power to the federal government
that properly resides with the state.29 °
Thus, under § 253(c), courts should first identify the source and
nature of local government franchise authority, and then determine if the
local government is properly exercising that authority. The source of
franchise authority can be found in the property rights of the local
government or through express delegation by the state. Even if this
authority is granted, its exercise could still be removed by a preemptive
state telecommunications statute291 or by delegation of franchise powers
to a state utility commission. 292 Only if the franchise is consistent with
state law can the court consider whether the compensation is fair and
reasonable under federal law.
C.

Courts Should Use the Totality of the CircumstancesApproach to
Determine Whether the CompensationRequired by the Local
Government Is Fairand Reasonable

Once a court has determined that a local government's franchise fee
complies with state law, the court should consider the totality of
circumstances to decide if the compensation is fair and reasonable under
§ 253(c). The text and history of § 253(C), 293 as well as analogous U.S.
Supreme Court precedent, 294 support this approach. Failure to adopt this

286. See, e.g., PECO Energy Co. v. Township of Haverford, No. 99-4766, 1999 WL 1240941
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1999).
287. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992).
288. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
289. See supra Part I.A-B.
290. See supra Part I.C.
291. See City of Denver v. Qwest Corp., 18 P.3d 748, 757-58 (Colo. 2001).
292. See, e.g., Bellsouth Telecomms. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1177 (11th Cir.
2001).
293. See supra Part 11.B.
294. See supra Part IV.
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approach could potentially lead to an unconstitutional taking of local
government property or commandeering of local governments. 295
1.

The Text and Legislative History of§ 253(c) Support a Broad
Interpretationof Fairand Reasonable Compensation

Courts that have limited local government compensation to costs for
actual use of the public rights-of-way, such as repair of street cuts, have
interpreted § 253(c) too narrowly. The text of § 253(c) reads in relevant
part, "[n]othing in this section affects the authority of a State or local
government to manage the public rights-of-way or to requirefair and
reasonable compensationfrom telecommunicationsproviders.., for use
of public rights-of-way .... ,,296 The wording of this section strongly
suggests an affirmation, not a limitation, of local government authority.
The section begins with a broadly worded admonition, and is followed
by a general authorization, signaling that Congress did not intend to limit
local government to a narrow cost-recovery interpretation, but instead
intended to preserve traditional local government control.
In addition, Congress' use of the word "compensation," rather than
"costs" is instructive. The word "compensation" indicates a more
expansive interpretation than the cost-recovery method adopted by many
courts.297 In other areas of the 1996 Act, notably the Pole Attachment
Act, Congress expressly limited fees to incurred costs. 298 It did not do so

for § 253(c). This suggests Congress intentionally chose the term
rather than "costs." 299 Furthermore, Congress
authorized the FCC to set rates for pole attachments, but did not
authorize the FCC to set rates for use of public rights-of-way, indicating
its intention to leave this authority to local governments. 300 If Congress
had intended to restrict local governments to recover only physical costs,
it could have included language to that effect.
Further, the legislative history of the phrase "fair and reasonable
compensation" in § 253(c) suggests that Congress intended local
governments to set their own levels of compensation for public rights-of-

"compensation"

295. See infra Part V.C.3.
296. 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2000) (emphasis added).

297. See supra Part 11.B.
298. 47 U.S.C. § 224(d)(1).
299. See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624-25 (6th Cir. 2000); Qwest Corp. v.
City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1327 (D.N.M. 2002).
300. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 224(b)(1), 253.
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way. 30 1 The House floor discussion demonstrates an unwillingness by
Congress to have local governments subsidize telecommunications
providers, 30 2 and indicates an awareness that § 253(c) would allow local
governments to set their own rates for compensation by
telecommunications providers. 30 3 For example, Congressman Barton
specifically stated that cities should be allowed to set the compensation
for use of their public rights-of-way. 30 4 Taken together, it is apparent that
Congress intended to allow local governments to set the amount of fair
and reasonable compensation for use of their rights-of-way, without
limiting recovery to actual costs.
2.

Analogous U.S. Supreme CourtPrecedentSupports the Totality of
the CircumstancesApproach

In cases interpreting the Telegraph Act, the U.S. Supreme Court
firmly sustained the authority of local governments to require fees from
private companies using public rights-of-way.3 5 Marked similarities
between the telegraph and telecommunications context make this
precedent applicable to telecommunications companies. Both telegraph
and telecommunications companies require access to public rights-ofway to deploy their facilities.30 6 Cities offer this access in exchange for
payment. 30 7 At the turn of the nineteenth century, the Court approved
this arrangement in City of St. Louis and did not limit the form or
method of payment required of telegraph companies as long as it was
reasonable. 30 8 The Court upheld a variety of fees as reasonable,
including those charged for rental, licensing, and general governmental
supervision. 309 In no case did the Court require that the fees be tied to the
physical or actual costs of the telegraph providers' use of the public

301. See supranotes 126-33 and accompanying text.
302. 141 CONG. REC. H8460 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
303. Id.

304. Id.
305. See supraPart IV.
306. See City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 99 (1893) (telegraph); Qwest Corp.
v. City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1308 (D.N.M. 2002) (telecommunications).
307. See McQUILLIN, supra note 10, § 34.37.
308. AtI. & Pac. Tel. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1903); W. Union Tel.
Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 187 U.S. 419, 425 (1903); City ofSt. Louis, 148 U.S. at 99, 105.
309. City of Philadelphia,190 U.S. at 164-65; Borough of New Hope, 187 U.S. at 425; City of S.
Louis 148 U.S. at 99, 105.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 78:901, 2003

rights-of-way. 310 This precedent was expressly followed in City of
Dearborn and City of Gary, which applied the principles31 set forth in the
early telegraph cases to the telecommunications context.
The 1996 Act, like the Telegraph Act, offers communications
companies a permissive grant to access local public rights-of-way.
Congress designed both Acts to promote new technologies that were
important to the nation's economic development, 31 2 but in both cases the
importance of local control remained paramount. In City of St. Louis, the
Court judicially preserved the authority of local governments to require
compensation under the Telegraph Act. In § 253(c), Congress issued
a
3 13
control.
local
to
subject
statutorily
and
expressly
grant
permissive
In sum, U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting the Telegraph Act
recognized that local governments have property interests in public
rights-of-way and can require compensation when this property is used
by private companies.3 14 The Court reaffirmed the continuing vitality of
this doctrine in Loretto,315 and lower courts have applied these principles

in the telecommunications context.3 16 Because of the similarities
between the Telegraph Act and the 1996 Act, this precedent provides
valuable guidance to courts interpreting the 1996 Act.
3.

UnconstitutionalResults Can Occur if§ 253(c) Is InterpretedToo
Narrowly

An interpretation of § 253(c) that limits local governments to
recovering only actual costs, rather than compensation for the value of
its property, could create unconstitutional results. 31 7 Courts interpreting
federal legislation must construe statutory language to avoid

310. City of Philadelphia, 190 U.S. at 162-63; Borough of New Hope, 187 U.S. at 426; City of St.
Louis 148 U.S. at 99, 104.
311. See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
312. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (2000)); Telegraph Act of 1866, ch. 230, 14 Stat. 221 (repealed 1947); see also
City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001); Field, supranote 3, at 248.
313. 47 U.S.C. § 253(c).
314. See supra Part IV.

315. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 429-30 (1982).
316. See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789-90 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd,

206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000); City of Gary v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ind. 2000).
317. See Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1328-29 (D.N.M. 2002); see
also Worstell, supra note 86, at 467-69.
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constitutional conflicts whenever possible. 318 Under the Fifth
Amendment, the federal government cannot take local government
property without providing just compensation. 319 Further, under the
Commerce Clause, Congress cannot compel local governments to
subsidize private companies as part of a federal regulatory scheme. 320 To
avoid these constitutional conflicts, courts should interpret § 253(c)
broadly to recognize the property rights of local governments under state
law and to provide adequate compensation when telecommunications
companies use public rights-of-way.
In City of St. Louis, the U.S. Supreme Court held that local
governments can require just compensation even if the federal
government allows private access to public rights-of-way. 32 1 Federal
seizure of local government property is prohibited in the same way that
taking private property is barred.322 If a local government has a property
right for which it can obtain value and the federal government prevents it
from doing so, the federal government could be authorizing an
unconstitutional taking.323 Courts assume that Congress understands the
constitutional implications of its statutory language.324 Therefore, courts
should interpret § 253(c) to avoid an unconstitutional result.
Further, paying for property use is a cost of doing business for
telecommunications providers. 325 The cables, wires, and transmission
boxes necessary to provide telecommunications services have a physical
presence. 326 If these providers did not have access to public rights-ofway, they would have to seek permission from private landowners and
locate equipment on private property.327
A narrow cost-recovery interpretation of § 253(c) potentially
commandeers local governments into implementing a federal regulatory
program and enacting federal policy, in violation of the Commerce
318. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
319. See supraPart I.A.
320. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992).
321. See City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 101 (1893).
322. See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984).
323. See California v. United States, 395 F.2d 261, 264 (9th Cir. 1968).
324. See U.S. W. Corp. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999).
325. See Bellsouth Telecomms. v. City of Orangeburg, 522 S.E.2d 804, 806 (S.C. 1999).
326. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982); see also
Worstell, sapranote 86, at 467-69.
327. See City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 97 (1893).
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Clause, by forcing them to support telecommunications companies at
public expense.3" 8 When cities are limited to a cost-recovery model for
the use of their rights-of-way,329 private companies receive the benefit of
property held in trust for the public without paying for its full value. In
effect, the company is granted a free public resource. 330 This results in
public subsidization of private companies. 33' Congress may not compel
local governments to subsidize private companies.3 32 Such
commandeering is prohibited by the U.S. Constitution.3 33 To avoid
creating unconstitutional results, courts should broadly interpret § 253 to
allow the public to be appropriately compensated for the use of its
property.
D.

Local Governments May Use a Variety of Methods to Determine
What Is "Fairand Reasonable Compensation"

If the state has not set limits on compensation, local governments
should be able to determine the amount of compensation for use of their
rights-of-way. Compensation can be based on several factors, including
the nature of the local government's interest in the rights-of-way, 334 and
what other companies pay.335 Further, the franchise fees can
appropriately be based on a percentage of the telecommunications
provider's gross revenue. 336
The nature of the local government interest in the public rights-ofway can be a factor in calculating appropriate compensation. Certain
property rights have value, which can be used to establish a fair and
reasonable amount of compensation.337 If the local government has
328. See Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1328-29 (D.N.M. 2002).
329. See Grant County v. Qwest Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1251 (D.N.M. 2001).
330. See City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 1329.
331. See id. at 1329.

332. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992). In addition, many state
constitutions have provisions specifically prohibiting such a gift of public resources to private
companies, so such an interpretation potentially creates unconstitutional results at the state level.
See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 6; CAL CONST. art. XVI, § 6; N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8; WASH.

CONST. art. VIII, § 7.
333. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York, 505 U.S. at 175.
334. See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789-90 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff d,
206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
335. See id.

336. See id.; Qwest Corp. v. City of Portland, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1258-59 (D. Or. 2002);
Bellsouth Telecomms. v. City of Orangeburg, 522 S.E.2d 804, 808 (S.C. 1999).

337. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
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complete ownership of the streets, in the same manner as a private
owner, the appropriate compensation is fair rental value, 338 the method
used by the federal government to determine compensation for use of its
own property. 339 If the local government holds the right-of-way as an
easement, this interest has value,340 which has been measured in
different ways depending upon the circumstances) 4 1 If the public rightof-way is held in trust for the public, the local government arguably has
a duty to receive compensation for the property on behalf of the
public.34 2 The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that reasonable rental
may be appropriate in this case as well.343
If the portion of the public rights-of-way used by the
telecommunications provider could bring funds to the local government,
it has value for which the local government should be compensated. 344 If
the local government gave away this valuable property for free, it would
not only be neglecting the best interests of its citizens, 345 but it would
also violate many state constitutions.346 The appropriate amount 347
of
limits.
state-imposed
to
up
bear,
can
market
the
what
is
compensation
The underlying purpose of local government authority over public
rights-of-way is to control the streets and alleys for the benefit of the
public, 348 which includes receiving compensation when the land is used
by a private company. 349
If local governments can receive compensation from other companies
for use of public rights-of-way, they should be able to require
compensation from telecommunications companies as well. The
government's loss of the space appropriated by a telecommunications
provider could be measured in terms of what other providers are willing

338. See City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 97 (1893).
339. 43 C.F.R. § 2803.1-2 (2002).

340. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
341. See id. at 261-62.
342. See NAT'L LEAGUE OF CITIES, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: WHAT IT MEANS
TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 3 (1996).
343. See City of St. Louis, 148 U.S. at 100.

344. See California v. United States, 395 F.2d 261, 264 (9th Cir. 1968).
345. See Nat'l League of Cities, supra note 342, at 3.
346. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 6; CAL CONST. art. XVI, § 6; N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8;
WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.

347. See Nat'l League of Cities, supranote 342, at 3.
348. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 10, § 30.40.
349. See Am. Pub. Works Ass'n, supranote 23, at 1.
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to pay.350 Utilities other than telecommunications providers, such as
cable television 35' and electrical providers,3 52 also use public rights-ofway. Local governments generally receive payment from these utilities
in the form of a percentage of gross revenue.353
A telecommunications provider's gross revenue is an appropriate
basis from which to calculate compensation, even if it is not equivalent
to the local government's costs. 354 U.S. Supreme Court decisions suggest
that there is nothing inherently unreasonable about basing franchise fees
on the gross revenue of a communications company within a particular
jurisdiction.355 Many lower courts have expressly allowed such a
calculation.356 Even courts that have limited fees for other reasons have
not disputed that fees can be revenue based. For example, a Florida
district court indicated that a one percent fee based on gross revenue was
reasonable if allowed by state law.357
Basing fees on a percentage of gross revenue is a fair approximation
of the value of a companies' use of public rights-of-way. Because it is an
indication of the amount of a company's business in a particular
jurisdiction, gross revenue reflects the value of their use of the right-ofway. 358 Courts have agreed that for fees to be valid, their purpose must
be expressly stated and the fees must be related to a company's presence
in the public rights-of-way. 359 Fees based on a percentage of gross
350. See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2000).
351. See City ofDallas v. FCC, 118 F.3d 393,393 (5th Cir. 1997).
352. See Alachua County v. Florida, 737 So.2d 1065, 1066 (Fla. 1999).
353. See City of Dallas, 118 F.3d at 393; Alachua County, 737 So.2d at 1066.
354. See Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1328 (D.N.M. 2002); TCG
Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd, 206 F.3d 618 (6th
Cir. 2000).
355. For example, City of St. Louis indicates that although Western Union was charged based on
the number of its poles, other telegraph companies were apparently "taxed on their gross income for
city purposes." City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 98 (1893). The Court did not
suggest that such a calculation was impermissible.
356. See City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d at 625 (upholding a franchise fee based on 4% of the
telecommunication provider's gross revenue); accord Bellsouth Telecomms. v. City of Orangeburg,
522 S.E.2d 804, 808 (S.C. 1999) (upholding a franchise fee based on 5% of the telecommunication
provider's gross revenue).
357. Bellsouth Telecomms. v. City of Coral Springs, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1309 (S.D. Fla. 1999),
aff'd in part and rev 'd in part sub nom. Bellsouth Telecomms. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d
1169 (11 th Cir. 2001).
358. See City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 1326-27; City of Gary v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 732
N.E.2d 149, 156 (Ind. 2000).
359. See, e.g., PECO Energy Co. v. Township of Haverford, No. 99-4766, 1999 WL 1240941, at
*7-8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1999).

Fair and Reasonable Compensation
revenue fulfill both these conditions. Such fees in franchises predating
360
the 1996 Act were presumably considered "fair and reasonable.
Nothing has changed since passage of the 1996 Act that would render
these fees unreasonable.
Furthermore, the 1996 Act expressly allows the use of a percentage of
gross revenue for payment of certain franchise fees. Cities entering into
franchise agreements with cable and OVS companies are allowed to
charge revenue-based fees: local governments may charge fees of up to
five percent of the gross revenue of cable television providers, 36 1 and
OVS operators are also charged based on their gross revenues.362 No
technological or statutory distinction compels a different result for
telecommunications franchises.
Local governments can choose from several methods of valuation
when setting franchise fees, including the value of the property as
appraised,36 3 prevailing rental value,364 and what other providers are
willing to pay.365 The local government may provide other services to
the telecommunications provider, such as supervision or licensing, for
which it can be further compensated.366 The method used to determine
be left to the discretion of the local
the amount of compensation should
367
government and the free market.
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 253(c) of the 1996 Act preserves the authority of local
governments to require fair and reasonable compensation for use of
public rights-of-way. 368 State law is the source of both local government

360. See, e.g., City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 (dating back to 1975); City of
Orangeburg,522 S.E.2d at 805 (dating back to 1993).
361. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (2000).
362. Id. § 573(c)(2)(B).
363. See City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 1309.
364. TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd, 206
F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000); City of Orangeburg,522 S.E.2d at 808.
365. See City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 1329; City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 790.
366. See AT&T Communications v. City of Eugene, 35 P.3d 1029, 1034 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
367. See generally Nat'l Ass'n of Telecomm. Officers and Advisors, Local Government
Principles Relating to Rights-Of-Way Management and Compensation & Ownership of
Telecommunications Facilities, available at http://www.natoa.org/public/articles/details.html?id=57
(Aug. 20, 1998) (encouraging local governments to require fair market value for use of public
rights-of-way to fulfill their duty to the public to responsibly manage public land).
368. 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2000).
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property rights and franchising authority. 369 Therefore, when evaluating
whether a local government franchise fee requires fair and reasonable
compensation from a telecommunications provider, courts should first
consider state law.37° Only after the court has identified the nature of the
local government authority can it consider if the fee is fair and
reasonable under federal law.
Some courts have interpreted § 253(c) too narrowly, limiting local
governments to recover only direct costs for private companies' use of
public rights-of-way. 37 1 Courts taking this approach potentially violate
the U.S. Constitution by allowing private companies to appropriate a
property interest without compensation, and by commandeering local
governments into federal service. 372 Other courts have examined the
totality of the circumstances surrounding a franchise and have allowed
local governments to require greater compensation than merely direct
costs. 3 73 The text and legislative history of § 253(c) and analogous U.S.
Supreme Court precedent support this approach.374 Thus, when
considering the validity of a particular franchise fee, courts should first
determine the source of local government authority under state law, and
then apply a totality of the circumstances approach to determine if the
fee is fair and reasonable.

369. See supra Part I.A-B.

370. See Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1318 (D.N.M. 2000).
371. See Grant County v. Qwest Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1249 (D.N.M. 2001).
372. See supra Part V.C.3.

373. See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789-90 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd,
206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
374. See supra Part V.C.1-2.

